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Abstract:  In this study, we use simulations from the Social Policy and Development 
Centre’s large-scale empirical model of Pakistan’s economy to quantify the economic 
losses resulting from the devastating earthquake that hit the country on October 8, 2005.  
We then use the model to trace the path that the economy can be expected to follow 
under the relief and reconstruction assumptions that seem most plausible at present.  The 
main results are as follows: First, the earthquake could initially shave off 1½ percentage 
points from economic growth.  In the absence of reconstruction, this initial hit would lead 
to permanent losses of levels of the capital stock, consumption, and income that are 
substantial.  Second, the assumed rebuilding effort of $5.8 billion over a five-year period 
will bring the economy back only half-way to the path that would have prevailed in the 
absence of the earthquake.  Third, this rebuilding effort will be inflationary in the short 
run, and could add 2 percentage points to the rate of increase of consumer prices in 2005-
06 and 1 percentage point the following year.   
                                                 
* We would like to thank Aisha Bano for her assistance.     
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  
he massive earthquake, measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale, which rocked northern 
Pakistan and Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) on October 8, 2005, has left a 
devastating toll of death and destruction.  Assessments of the damage, its economic 
impact, and the cost of reconstruction have been much debated.  Most experts see very 
little effect on overall economic growth.  Yet, the relief and reconstruction needs have 
been estimated by some donor institutions to be about $5.2 billion—see the two 
companion studies carried out by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, 
ADB/WB (2005) and the United Nations, UN (2005),—whereas the estimated figure 
given by the Planning Commission is much higher than that.1     
 In this special report we use the Social Policy and Development Centre’s 
(SPDC’s) large-scale empirical model of the Pakistan economy to first isolate the effects 
that the earthquake itself will have on the economy, without factoring in the effects of the 
reconstruction activity.  That is, hypothetically, in the absence of any reconstruction 
efforts, how much output and income would be lost to the economy and what effect 
would the earthquake have on future growth and prospects for the economy?  We then 
use our model to provide simulation results that trace the path that the economy will 
follow under the assumptions in the early relief and reconstruction scenario that are laid 
out in the above-mentioned companion studies of the ADB/WB and the UN, that were 
commissioned by the Government of Pakistan.  However, we have augmented their 
reconstruction scenario assumptions somewhat to postulate a total reconstruction outlay 
of $5.8 billion—rather than $5.2 billion—since this was the amount that was pledged at 
the donors’ conference in Islamabad on November 19, 2005.  At this point, this 
reconstruction scenario seems to be the one most likely to be adopted by the government.     
 Our model-simulation results lead to several noteworthy findings.  First, the 
adverse effects of the earthquake alone on economic growth are significant, although they 
are temporary—largely restricted to FY 2005-06.  But those who focus only on the 
“growth” effects miss the point.  The real economic losses from the earthquake arise from 
                                                 
1 The discrepancy between the donors’ estimate of about $5 billion for reconstruction needs and the 
Planning Commission’s estimate of about $10 billion was reported, for example, in Daily Dawn, Karachi, 
November 8, 2005. 
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the reductions in the levels of output, consumption and income resulting from the loss of 
the capital stock and these are quite significant; these level-shifts would be permanent in 
the absence of any rebuilding, even if growth returns subsequently to its original pace.       
Second, the subsequent output growth and particularly investment growth that 
takes place in the aftermath of the quake in the $5.8 billion rebuilding scenario we 
consider is actually somewhat higher than what would happen in the baseline without an 
earthquake and any reconstruction activity.  However, this higher subsequent growth 
would five years later still only bring the economy part way back to the path that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the earthquake.   
Finally, importantly, because this has not been emphasized elsewhere enough, our 
model also predicts that the relief and reconstruction efforts will lead to a significant 
increase in inflation, at least in the absence of any explicit policy moves to counter this 
phenomenon.  So, the rebuilding will come at a cost that goes beyond the actual financial 
outlays on reconstruction activities.       
 While interpreting our quantitative results, it should be recognized that the loss of 
life, the human tragedy and the suffering resulting from the earthquake are, of course, 
immeasurable in any monetary terms.  We are restricting our analysis to the economic 
effects only because this is what we can measure with our model.  It is important to study 
these economic effects in a systematic way because such information can be very 
relevant for taking vital decisions on reconstruction activities and their modes of 
financing.  But, at the same time, considering such economic consequences and the 
money figures being associated with them as being the sum total of the losses resulting 
from the earthquake, would be inaccurate and highly inappropriate.     
 The balance of the paper is structured as follows:  section 2 takes the reader 
through the notional exercise of what the economic effects of the earthquake itself would 
be, based on our model, in the absence of any resources devoted to relief and 
reconstruction activities; section 3 presents results on what path the economy will follow 
relative to the baseline path under the relief and reconstruction scenario that seem to 
guide the government’s thinking at the moment, which is the one laid out in the UN and 
ADB/WB studies; and section 4 offers conclusions that emerge from the analysis.       
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2.  ISOLATING THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE EARTHQUAKE  
istorical experience from around the world suggests that economic activity follows 
a V-shaped pattern after a natural disaster.  The disruption of normal economic 
activity and the damage to the infrastructure and the capital stock more generally initially 
leads to a loss of output.  But subsequently, the economy receives a boost from the 
emergency relief funds and increased levels of spending related to rebuilding efforts that 
usually follow such disasters.   
Our purpose here is to quantify these responses in the case of the Pakistan 
earthquake in a systematic manner.  SPDCs large-scale model of the Pakistan economy is 
well-suited for this purpose for several reasons.  First, by doing appropriate simulation 
analysis, it allows us to separate the notional effects that the earthquake alone would have 
on the economy from any effects of the reconstruction activity.  Second, it gives us the 
effects on a large number of economic variables and the channels of transmission of these 
effects.  Third, it allows us to study any unintended consequences of the reconstruction—
such as an increase in inflation—that come out.2 
  
The Integrated Social Policy and Macro (ISPM) Model 
A brief sketch of the model being used to study the effects of the earthquake seems in 
order.  The ISPM model is a highly disaggregated model and consists of more than 300 
equations many of which are behavioural equations and many of which are identities.  
The behavioural equations have all been estimated using regression techniques and are 
based on consistent national level data from 1973-74 to 2004-05.     
 The model emphasizes the interlinkages between the macroeconomy, public 
finances and social sector development.  The macroeconomy affects the tax base and, 
therefore, the tax revenues.  It also affects the demand for social sector facilities—such as 
schools and hospitals—and, therefore, the equilibrium quantity of social sector outputs.  
Public finances, in turn, affect both the macroeconomy and the social sector.  The former 
is affected through a direct impact of government expenditure on national income as well 
                                                 
2 In principle, although we have studied the early recovery and reconstruction expenditure assumptions that 
seem to guide government thinking at the moment, the model is also well-suited to analyzing alternative 
reconstruction scenarios and examining issues such as whether the way in which reconstruction 
expenditures are financed matters or not.   
H 
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as through the indirect influence of the budget deficit on monetary expansion and the rate 
of inflation; while the latter is affected by the availability of government resources and 
the influence of this on the level of development and recurring outlays to the social 
sector.  Finally, social sector development feeds back into the macroeconomy—through 
enhancing human capital and through better health standards, both of which have a 
favourable effect on production; it also feeds back into public finances because social 
sector spending has consequences for the budget deficit, level of debt stocks and the debt- 
servicing burden of the government.            
All three levels of government—federal, provincial and local—are incorporated 
into the public revenue and public expenditure blocks of the model.  This, together with 
the level of disaggregation that exists in the model for government expenditures, allows 
us to calibrate our simulations quite closely to the assumptions on expenditures that are 
made in the early recovery and reconstruction scenarios laid out by the ADB, WB, and 
the UN. 
 
Channels of transmission and calibration of the shocks 
Within the model, the effects of the earthquake are assumed to be captured through several 
channels.  The primary channel is the loss of the capital stock, including infrastructure.  
Another important channel is the loss of some of the population, which affects the labour 
force and, therefore, employment levels.  There is also an additional temporary loss of 
employment due to both demand and supply factors; on the supply side, due to injuries and 
homelessness many are unable to work, while on the demand side many employed people 
do not have jobs left to go to due to the physical loss of the place in which they worked or a 
shutdown of the production activity they were involved in.  Finally, we incorporate an 
effect on agricultural output through a loss of cultivated land.  It is important to note that 
our model is not particularly well-suited to capturing any effect from losses of livestock 
and, thus, this channel has not been incorporated into the analysis.   
 The areas most affected by the earthquake are AJK and the three districts of 
Batagram, Mansehra and Shangla in NWFP.3  One problem in using our model 
                                                 
3 The districts of Abbotabad and Kohistan in NWFP have also been affected, although to a relatively lesser 
degree.   
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simulations is that the figures for AJK are not integrated in the official economic data for 
Pakistan, which are what have been used to calibrate and estimate our model.  Thus, our 
explicit quantitative analysis is restricted to the effects on NWFP only.  In order to 
estimate the AJK effects informally, a doubling of the estimates for NWFP would give a 
correct order of magnitude, although these losses would not show in the measured 
statistics of Pakistan.       
 To calibrate the loss of NWFP’s capital stock, it is assumed that the entire capital 
stock of the three most affected districts listed above has been destroyed.  While this 
might be an overestimate, anecdotal reports do suggest that the bulk of the capital stock 
in these districts may have been lost.  Since two other districts of NWFP, Abbotabad and 
Kohistan have also suffered some capital stock damage, which we are not directly 
accounting for, 100 percent of the capital stock of these three districts might be a 
reasonable ballpark figure of how much of the total capital stock of NWFP has been 
destroyed.   
One needs also to make an assumption about the share of the aggregate capital 
stock that was in place in the affected districts of NWFP, since our model does not 
disaggregate by district.  The assumption made here is that the capital stock in place in 
different districts in the country is roughly in proportion to the population.  As shown in 
Table 1, the share of the nation’s population in the three most affected districts of NWFP 
is about 1½ percent.4  As such, we have calibrated the shock to the capital stock to be a 
decline of 1½ percent in the private and public capital stocks in agriculture, 
manufacturing and other sectors, including federal and provincial infrastructures.5  
 
                                                 
4 The share of the total labour force is a bit less at about 1.2 percent.  
5 This translates into a nominal loss of the capital stock of about Rs. 260 billion in 2005-06.  This is quite a 
bit larger than the sum of the estimated direct damage and indirect losses of social and physical 
infrastructure and economic services for NWFP reported in ADB/WB (2005) of Rs. 73 billion [see table 2, 
p.3 of that study].  However, in their damage valuation criteria, immovable assets (i.e. damaged buildings) 
have been assessed at book value and thus evaluated at the prices of the year in which they were built [see 
Box 2, Annex 1 of the study].   With the building materials subindex of the wholesale price index (WPI) 
having risen by 4 ½-fold since 1981-82 and by about 2½-fold since 1990-91, for example, the damage 
assessment using book value is likely to be substantially understated.  These years are chosen for 
illustrative purposes only, and do not bear any special significance except to note that some of the buildings 
would have been around since 1981-82 at least and many are likely to have been built before 1990-91 as 
well.  (For information purposes the overall WPI has risen 5½-fold since 1981-82 and nearly 3-fold since 
1990-91, while the overall CPI has risen 4½-fold since 1981-92 and about 2½-fold since 1990-91.)                 
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TABLE 1 
SELECTED STATISTICS 
Regions 
Population 
in 1998 
(thousands) 
Shares 
(percent) 
Cultivated Area 
in 2000* 
(thousands of acres) 
Shares 
(percent) 
Labor Force 
in 1998 
(thousands) 
Shares 
(percent) 
Pakistan 132,352 100 40,768 100 23,079 100 
NWFP 17,735 13.40 4,096 10.05 2,518 10.91 
Batagram 307 0.23 73 0.18 41 0.18 
Mansehra 1,153 0.87 198 0.49 158 0.68 
Shangla 435 0.33 122 0.30 69 0.30 
Abbotabad 881 0.67 80 0.20 121 0.52 
Kohistan 473 0.36 70 0.17 82 0.36 
Selected NWFP Districts 
(Batagram+Mansehra+Shangla)  1,895 1.43 455 0.96 268 1.16 
Memo: AJK 2,973 N/A 427 N/A N/A N/A 
*except AJK figure is for 1998.   
Sources:  Pakistan and NWFP data for population and labour force are from Federal, Provincial and District Census Reports 
(1998) and for cultivated area from Agricultural Census (2000).  AJK data are from Azad Kashmir at a Glance, 1999.  
 
With respect to the population loss, it is assumed that the total death toll from the 
earthquake is 100,000.  This is higher than the official figure of about 73,000 dead 
reported so far, but it seems likely that the official figures understate the death toll given 
the extent of the devastation that has been reported and thus, it is quite probable that this 
figure will continue to be revised upwards in the coming weeks.6  Even the figure of 
100,000 dead seems to us to be a conservative estimate, in fact.  Of the deaths, 50 percent 
(or 50,000) are presumed to have taken place in NWFP districts.  Our model requires an 
assessment of the allocation of this figure between different groups, namely children 
under the age of 10, females over the age of 10, and males over the age of 10 and our 
assumed numbers for these are 15,000, 17,000, and 18,000 deaths, respectively, which is 
in proportion to the existing population in each of these groups.  The loss of some of the 
population leads in the model to some loss to the potential labour pool.  Taking into 
account the labour participation rates of females and males, this translates into a 
permanent loss of about 15,000 people from the labour force.         
Official government figures for the total number injured stand at about 130,000, 
of which about 70,000 are seriously injured—these figures also seem low given the 
extent of the devastation and there is a possibility that they may continue to be revised 
                                                 
6 The official reported figure of 73,000 dead is as of December 2, 2005, taken from the website of the 
Federal Relief Commission of the Government of Pakistan.    
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upwards also.7  About 3.2 million to 3.5 million people are estimated to be in need of 
assistance, including about an estimated 2.8 million people without shelter.8  The injury 
losses and loss of shelter affect the supply of employment.  In addition, the damages to 
assets and disruption to goods and services delivery is likely to have an effect on the 
demand for employment.  The ADB/WB study estimates the employment loss to NWFP 
areas to be around 192,000.  This is the figure we have assumed to be the temporary loss 
of NWFP employment in 2005-06, resulting from the above factors.  
Finally, there is a loss of cultivated area, which affects agricultural output.  The 
assumption made is that all of the cultivated area of the three affected districts of NWFP 
is lost to cultivation for an indefinite period.  As shown earlier in Table 1, this amounts to 
a loss of about 1 percent of the total cultivated area of Pakistan.  In the reconstruction 
scenario discussed later, this cultivated area is gradually restored over a period of five 
years.    
The channels of transmission that are operational in the model in gauging the 
effects of the earthquake on the economy and the specific assumptions made about them, 
which have been discussed in detail above, are summarized in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT EARTHQUAKE 
Channels of 
Transmission Calibration of shocks for affected areas of NWFP 
Loss of Capital stock 
Decrease of 1.5% in private and public capital stocks in agriculture, 
manufacturing, and other sectors, including a decrease of 1.5% in federal and 
provincial infrastructure of Pakistan.   
Decrease in Population 50,000 dead (15,000 children, 17,000 males over age 10, 18,000 females over age 10) implies a permanent loss to the labour force of about 15,000       
Temporary Employment 
Losses 192,000 jobs in 2005-06  
Loss of cultivated area  1% loss of cultivated area of Pakistan 
 
Model simulations on the economic effects of the earthquake  
The effects that would result from the earthquake alone on the growth rate of selected 
economic variables according to our model simulations are shown in Table 3.  While this 
                                                 
7The official reported figures of about 70,000 seriously injured and 60,000 other injured are as of December 
2, 2005, taken from the website of the Federal Relief Commission of the Government of Pakistan.    
8The assistance need figures are from UN (2005) and the figure for those needing shelter is from ADB/WB 
(2005).    
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exercise is notional, it helps to isolate the economic losses from the earthquake and thus 
the extent to which such losses will be recouped in the rebuilding scenario which is being 
proposed. 
 
 
In the absence of any relief or reconstruction activity, real GDP growth and per 
capita real GDP growth would fall nearly 1½ percentage points in FY 2005-06 (Table 3).9   
Thereafter, there is no effect on economic growth.  The initial declines in the growth rates 
reflect the losses to the capital stock, to the labour force, to employment and to the 
cultivated land that are a consequence of the earthquake, based on the assumptions 
discussed earlier.  Note that the decrease in the growth rate of investment in 2005-06 (2 
percentage points) is roughly two times the decline in the growth rate of consumption.  
As such, the composition of GDP shifts slightly from investment to consumption.   
The deviations of the path of selected variables from the baseline path that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the earthquake are shown in Figure 1.  The level of per 
capita real GDP takes an initial hit of nearly 1½ percent and then stays at this lower than 
baseline level subsequently (Panel A).  The capital stock, being an important factor 
behind the decline in GDP, follows the same pattern (Panel B).    
There is not a significant rise in the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio (Panel C), a 0.15 
percentage points rise in 2005-06, which falls back over time to just a 0.05 percentage 
points higher ratio than in the baseline.  The effect on the budget deficit as a proportion to 
                                                 
9 This is real GDP measured at factor cost, which can be viewed as the aggregate supply of goods and 
services being in the economy.    
TABLE 3 
NOTIONAL EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKE ON GROWTH  
(Percentage Points Deviation from Baseline) 
Selected Variables 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Growth of Real GDP   -1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real Consumption Growth  -0.9 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Real Investment Growth  -2.0 0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Private -2.6 0.9 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 
Public -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 
Real Per Capita GDP Growth  -1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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GDP following the earthquake is rather modest because there is no reconstruction activity 
built into the scenario yet to put increased pressure on the government’s financing gap. 
 
FIGURE 1 
NOTIONAL EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKE: 
DEVIATION FROM BASELINE PATH OF SELECTED VARIABLES 
A: Real Per Capita GDP B: Capital Stock
C: Budget Deficit to GDP Ratio D: Consumer Price Inflation
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Even in the absence of any reconstruction activity, there is a tendency for inflation 
to rise in the first two years because supply falls more than demand, initially.  
Specifically, consumer price inflation is higher than baseline by about 1½ percentage 
points in 2005-06 and by ½ percentage point in 2006-07 (Panel D).  However, inflation 
returns thereafter to more or less the baseline path.    
The model simulation results thus indicate significant aggregate level effects on 
consumption and output resulting from the massive earthquake.  However, the growth 
rates are not affected much beyond the current fiscal year of 2005-06, which, of course, 
means that the negative effects on levels would lead to a once and for all permanent 
decline in the level of per capita income (or a very long-lasting one at least) in the 
absence of any reconstruction activity. 
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The reader is reminded that our model’s quantitative results capture only the 
effects resulting from losses in the affected areas of NWFP.  One crude way to 
incorporate AJK effects in addition is to double the effects obtained in our model.  Going 
back to Table 1, the selected statistics shown there suggest that this doubling of the 
effects would be a conservative estimate; the population of AJK is actually one-and-a-
half times than that of the three districts most affected in NWFP and the cultivated land 
area is about the same.  However, if one wants the effects on measured statistics of 
Pakistan, which do not typically incorporate AJK for most variables, then we would not 
want to double the effects shown here for NWFP.    
   
3.  THE RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION SCENARIO  
e try to replicate the effects of the relief and reconstruction scenario laid out in 
UN (2005) and ADB/WB (2005) as closely as possible in the SPDC model since 
this is the scenario that seems to guide the government’s rebuilding plans at the moment.  
However, we have augmented the total outlays envisaged to $5.8 billion instead of the 
needs assessment of $5.2 billion made by these donor agencies because this is the amount 
that has been pledged at the donors’ conference of November 19, 2005, in Islamabad.  
This amount is assumed to be financed by concessional foreign borrowing.  In the model, 
we can capture the effects on measured statistics of Pakistan only and thus we need the 
amount to be allocated to the affected areas of NWFP only.  It is assumed that half of the 
relief and reconstruction efforts will be targeted to NWFP and half to AJK, which is 
roughly the regional shares of reconstruction costs allocated in ADB/WB (2005)—see 
Table 2 of that study.   
 The allocations of the relief and reconstruction expenditures to different types of 
activities assumed in our model simulations and their close correspondence to the 
assumptions made in the UN and ADB/WB studies are shown in Table 4.  Of the $5.8 
billion total outlay, $1.7 billion is assumed to be for early relief efforts and livelihood 
support, the same amount as in the studies mentioned above.  Half of this amount is 
earmarked for NWFP and it is front-loaded in the sense that one-third of the relief 
expenditure is assumed to take place in the remainder of FY2005-06 and one-third each 
in 2006-07 and 2007-08, respectively.  In the model, this relief is assumed to directly 
augment consumption. 
W 
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TABLE 4 
ASSUMPTIONS OF RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION SCENARIO 
Expenditures assumed in 
simulation   Allocation in SPDC model 
Expenditures assumed and 
allocation in UN (2005) 
and ADB/WB (2005)* 
$0.85 billion relief 
expenditures assumed 
allocated to NWFP (50% of  a 
total $1.7 billion):  
 
? 1/3 in 2005-06 
? 1/3 in 2006-07 
? 1/3 in 2007-08  
100% to consumption  $1.7 billion relief expenditures 
allocated as follows:  
  
? 12% to death and injury 
compensation 
 
? 64% to relief   
 
? 24% to early recovery (inc. 
restoration of livelihood) 
$2.05 billion reconstruction 
expenditures assumed 
allocated to NWFP (50% of  a 
total $4.1 billion)**: 
 
? 1/9 in 2005-06 
? 2/9 in 2006-07  
? 2/9 in 2007-08 
? 2/9 in 2008-09   
? 2/9 in 2009-10    
 
 
 
 
? 44% to private investment in 
sectors other than 
manufacturing and agriculture 
 
? 43% to provincial 
development expenditures: 
 
Economic services  
(13%)  
+Education (14%)  
+Health (9%)  
+Public health  
(5%)  
+Other  
(2%)   
 
? 13% to public investment:  
 
Agriculture  
(9%) 
+Manufacturing / other 
(4%)  
$3.5 billion reconstruction 
expenditures allocated as 
follows***:  
 
? 44% to private housing 
 
 
 
? 43% to:  
 
 
Transport, irrigation and 
energy (13%) 
+Education (14%)  
+Health (9%)  
+Water supply/sanitation 
and environment (5%)  
+Public administration 
(2%)  
 
? 13% to:  
 
Agriculture and livestock 
(9%)   
+Industry and services 
          (4%)  
*Sources: UN(2005), Table 1 and ADB/WB (2005), Table 2.  
**The total of relief and reconstruction expenditures assumed over a 5-year period amount to $5.8 billion, the amount pledged at the 
donors’ conference in Islamabad on November 19, 2005.  
***The total of $5.2 billion is the amount that has been assessed by the two companion studies of UN and ADB/WB as the amount 
needed for relief and reconstruction. 
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 The remainder amount of $4.1 billion is assumed to be allocated to the 
reconstruction of lost assets and the restoration of services.  This is $0.6 billion more than 
allocated in the ADB/WB report, reflecting the difference between the amount pledged 
and that study’s needs assessment.  Half of the reconstruction expenditures amount is 
assumed to be allocated to NWFP which is consistent with the ADB/WB scenario.  We 
assume that the reconstruction expenditure is uniformly spent over the remainder of 
FY2005-06 through the end of FY2009-10, about a five-year time horizon.   
 The allocation of the reconstruction outlays to different sectors made in our model 
simulations and those made in the ADB/WB study is also shown in Table 4.  Thus 44 
percent of the ADB/WB allocation to private housing shows up as a 44 percent allocation 
to private investment in other sectors in our model; a 43 percent allocation to the sectors 
of transport, irrigation, energy, education, health, water supply and sanitations, 
environment and public administration by ADB/WB shows up as a 43 percent allocation 
to provincial development expenditures in these same categories and in the same 
proportions in the model; and the 13 percent allocation to restoration of other agriculture 
and livestock assets as well as to restoration of other industry assets and services shows 
up as a 13 percent allocation to public investment in the model.   
 In addition, it is assumed that the rebuilding efforts will gradually restore 
cultivated land in the affected areas to the original amount in five years.  Specifically, a 
quarter of the cultivated land is assumed to be restored in each of the four fiscal years 
from 2006-07 through 2009-10. 
 
Path of the economy under the assumed rebuilding  
 The deviation from baseline of growth rates of selected variables under the relief 
and reconstruction scenario are shown in Table 5.  A comparison of Table 5 to Table 3 
shows that the hit to real GDP growth and per capita real GDP growth in 2005-06 (about 
a 1½ percentage points reduction in each) is about the same in the reconstruction scenario 
as in the earthquake scenario without rebuilding.  This is because the computed effects 
are based on real GDP at factor cost, which can be viewed as the aggregate supply of the 
economy.  The fall in aggregate supply resulting from losses of the capital stock, the 
labour force, employment and destruction of cultivated area, do not start to be made up 
until FY 2006-07.   
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Note, however, that the immediate hit to final domestic demand in the 
reconstruction scenario is less than without any rebuilding, as reflected in the lower falls 
relative to baseline in the 2005-06 growth rates of private consumption and private 
investment in Table 5 compared to Table 3.  This is a manifestation primarily of higher 
consumption and public investment resulting from reconstruction efforts.  
 In subsequent years beyond 2005-06, real GDP growth and per capita output 
growth increases relative to the baseline, reflecting the effects of the higher spending 
resulting from the reconstruction efforts.  With the reconstruction effort concentrated 
primarily on investment activities, growth of real investment is higher relative to baseline 
by about 2 percentage points in 2006-07 and about 1 percentage points in the subsequent 
two years.  Consumption growth still falls relative to baseline in the first two years, but 
less than it would without the relief effort.  Note that consumption growth also slightly 
dips down relative to baseline in 2008-09 because the exogenous shock to consumption 
from the relief efforts expires in that period, according to our assumptions.   
 The deviations from baseline of selected variables under the relief and 
reconstruction scenario are plotted in Figure 2.  Panel A depicts how real per capita 
output after falling by 1½ percent relative to baseline gradually starts returning to the 
zero-axis, which would imply that it was back on the baseline path.  However, five years 
later it is still only about half-way back to the baseline path with real per capita output 
still about ¾ of percentage points below the baseline.  The capital stock (panel B) also 
reverses some of its losses but is still more than one percent below its baseline by the end 
TABLE 5 
GROWTH UNDER THE RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION SCENARIO  
(Percentage Points Deviation from Baseline) 
Selected Variables 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Growth of Real GDP   -1.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Real Consumption Growth  -0.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 
Real Investment Growth  -1.8 1.9 1.2 0.9 0.3 
Private -3.1 1.7 1.2 1.0 0.3 
Public 1.9 2.6 1.2 0.7 0.3 
Real Per Capita GDP Growth  -1.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
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of 2009-10.  These results suggest that, according to our model at least, under the 
rebuilding scenario of $5.8 billion it will take significantly more than five years—perhaps 
on the order of 10 years—to recoup the lost capital stock and the lost income and output 
that likely resulted from the October 8 earthquake. 
 
FIGURE 2 
RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION SCENARIO:  
DEVIATION FROM BASELINE PATH OF SELECTED VARIABLES   
 
A: Real Per Capita GDP B: Capital Stock
C: Budget Deficit to GDP Ratio D: Consumer Price Inflation
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The budget deficit as a share of GDP (Panel C of Figure 2) rises more in the 
reconstruction scenario than we saw earlier in figure 1.  Specifically, it rises by about 0.3 
percentage points in 2005-06 and 2006-07, then falls gradually to about 0.15 percentage 
points higher relative to baseline after five years.  Some of the reconstruction 
expenditures constitute public sector spending which is not being financed by higher 
taxation, which is the source of the modestly higher effect on the budget deficit relative to 
GDP.   
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The large amount of reconstruction spending does however increase inflation 
substantially relative to baseline.  The inflation rate is higher than baseline by more than 
2 percentage points in 2005-06 and by nearly 1½ percentage points in 2006-07 (Panel D).  
Thus if inflation was originally predicted to be about 7½ percent, for example, in each of 
these two years it would instead be 10 percent in 2005-06 and 9 percent in 2006-07.10  
Gradually, the inflation path returns to baseline by the end of FY 2009-10.   
Despite the fact that there is not inordinate pressure from the government budget 
deficit in the rebuilding scenario, the rise in inflation relative to baseline is not surprising.  
This is because reconstruction activity raises aggregate demand much faster than it 
restores the lost productive capacity of the economy that resulted from the earthquake.  In 
that sense, it is not necessarily and automatically the case that spending much more than 
$5.8 billion to achieve complete rebuilding within 5 years would be a better strategy 
because it would have severe consequences for the inflationary environment. If more 
money is to be spent, a more gradual approach to this spending may be more appropriate.  
In any case, there is a trade-off here for the government to evaluate.   
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
he main questions that we posed in this study with respect to the earthquake were 
the following:   How much economic loss has the earthquake caused that needs to 
be recouped?  Under the rebuilding scenario that seems most plausible at present, what 
path can the economy be expected to take and how much of the economic loss can be 
expected to be made up within five years under this scenario?  What pressures would the 
reconstruction efforts put on the government budget deficit and the inflation rate?  The 
quantitative answers to these questions seem to vary.  In this paper, we have attempted to 
use simulations from SPDC’s large-scale model of the Pakistan economy to shed light on 
these questions.  Our results lead to the following conclusions:   
 First, our model suggests, unlike the opinion of many experts, that the earthquake 
could initially shave off 1½ percentage points from economic growth, despite the 
                                                 
10 Government circles seem to be discounting these inflationary effects of the relief and reconstruction—
see, for example, the statement of the Minister of State for Finance reported in the Daily Dawn, Sunday, 
November 27, 2005.  Our model simulation results are suggesting that the inflationary impacts can be 
substantial and should be factored in the analysis of where the economy is headed in the aftermath of the 
earthquake.   
T 
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substantial reconstruction efforts being taken into account.  But this effect on growth is 
likely to be temporary, largely restricted to year 2005-06.  The initial hit from the 
earthquake leads to losses of levels of the capital stock, consumption and income that are 
substantial.  These effects do not include the economic losses in AJK, which would 
roughly double these costs but these extra costs would not show up in the measured 
economic statistics of Pakistan.      
Second, under the rebuilding effort assumed, which involves outlays of $5.8 
billion over a five-year period, growth in subsequent years will in fact be higher than it 
otherwise would have been which is not surprising.  However, this subsequent higher 
growth will only be enough to bring the economy back after five years about half-way to 
the path where it would have been in the absence of the earthquake.     
Finally, the reconstruction is likely to lead to a significant increase in inflation for 
about two or three years.  This is not because the rebuilding efforts put inordinate 
pressures on the budget deficit—such pressures are rather modest.  Rather, it is because 
the reconstruction activity restores aggregate demand much faster than it restores the lost 
capacity of the economy to produce output.  Thus, the government faces a delicate 
dilemma in that higher expenditures, more quickly disbursed would restore the economic 
losses faster but would be substantially more inflationary with the attendant adverse 
consequences of that.   
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